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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the incentives of patentholders to license their technologies for 
pure-revenue reasons. We hypothesize that this decision is mainly driven by 
characteristics of the innovation, which determine its technological attractiveness, the 
relevance of transaction costs in its transfer and the importance of the competition 
effect. By using the NBER Patent Citations Database and an original dataset of patented 
technologies devoted to license in an Internet marketplace, we find that importance, 
innovativeness, fit into the firm’s core and scope of the innovation affect the 
patentholder’s willingness to license it. Results increase our awareness on the drivers of 
technology licensing decisions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Licensing technologies is not a new phenomenon. However, in the last years it has 
increased considerably (Arora & Fosfuri, 2003). Practices such as to mine patent 
portfolios for royalties arose in the late-1980s or early-1990s, when important 
patentholders such as IBM or Texas Instruments resorted to it to face financial pressures 
–nowadays, royalties represent for these firms around $1billion a year- (Rivette & 
Kline, 2000).  Indeed, these authors present licensing as an option to generate revenues 
from unexploited technologies, for which the firm had not identified any use in 
products.  
 
Different estimates suggest that the amount of unused technologies is far from 
irrelevant. According to a 1998 survey by BTG, 67% of US firms own unexploited 
technology assets that amount on average more than one third of their patent portfolio. 
A survey to European inventors (Giuri et al., 2005) reports a lower bound of 36% of 
unexploited patents. This percentage reaches a 50% in the chemicals and 
pharmaceutical sector, even though only a 22% of them are actually unused -the rest are 
not applied in products but used for strategic purposes such as blocking competitors-. 
Not only there are unused technologies in firms’ portfolios but also underused 
technologies. Elton et al. (2002) estimate that 10% of the patent portfolio of a research-
intensive company is underexploited and it could generate at least a 5% of her operating 
income if licensed. They suggest outside industries as particularly attractive in order to 
find new uses for unexploited technologies or alternative uses for already exploited 
technologies1. However, this is not a trivial task. A first problem lies on being able to 
identify worthy applications in unknown sectors. Another limitation is the cost of 
searching for partners in distant technological and geographical settings due to the 
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fragmentation of the market for technology (Arora et al, 2001). Some pioneer firms try 
to overcome these obstacles by hiring away scientists who conduct basic 
interdisciplinary research and are able to identify a variety of applications of a 
technology (Elton et al., 2002) or by listing their technological assets in a public shelve 
where firms from different industries may have easy access to such as the Internet2. 
 
In this paper, we will consider licensing under this view. Our aim is to analyse the use 
of licensing as a source to obtain revenues from unused or underused technologies by 
firms with research and development capabilities. We will refer to this type of licensing 
as pure revenue licensing, in order to distinguish it from licensing practices motivated 
by other reasons -strategic or related to efficiency-. In particular, we seek to characterize 
the type of technologies that the mentioned firms are willing to devote to this type of 
licensing. In order to identify them, we rely on a selection of firms that decide to offer 
some of their innovations for license in a technology marketplace that, given its 
characteristics, is assumed to capture only pure revenue licensing.  
 
Licensing out is an alternative to in-house development or, in firms with research and 
development capabilities, a by-product of it. Licensing allows obtaining revenues but it 
introduces competition and erodes monopoly profits. The economics literature has 
suggested different strategic motivations that can lead to the use of licensing by a 
technology holder that exploits the technology by herself, such as the selection of 
competitors (Rockett, 1990), the desire to establish a standard or to deter entry (Gallini, 
1984). Arora and Fosfuri (2003), however, suggest that when there are technology 
holders that compete in the product market with substitute technologies, strategic and 
revenue motivations actually mix up. In this case, licensing limits the negative impact of 
competitors’ licenses and at the same time, it increases total revenues by the firm. The 
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management literature (Teece, 1988) has pointed out the use of licensing as a substitute 
to own development, when the innovator firm is less efficient to exploit a technology 
than a potential licensee. This view implicitly assumes that the innovator firm evaluates 
these alternatives having in mind an application for the technology. 
 
Empirical studies on the licensing literature are scarce. Anand and Khanna (2000), in a 
cross-industry study on licensing contracts, shed light on the relevance of practices such 
as exclusive contracts, cross-licensing or previous relationships between the parties. 
Sine et al. (2003) and Fosfuri (2004) examine the determinants of the rate of licensing, 
in a university setting and in the chemical industry, respectively. The latter analyses it 
as a function of the market characteristics that shape the balance between royalty 
revenues and increased competition. Shane (2001), following the entrepreneurship 
literature, examines the effect of technological opportunity on the decision to create a 
new firm based on a license from a university patented innovation. Therefore, he 
analyzes licensing from the perspective of the incentives by the licensees -and a 
particular group of them, startups-. 
 
This paper aims to contribute to the stream of empirical literature on licensing by 
understanding, at the innovation level, the technological determinants of firm licensing. 
We analyze the incentives that a firm with development capabilities has in order to 
license her innovations as a function of their technological characteristics. We consider 
that such characteristics affect technological opportunity, costs of transfer and the 
creation of own competition. We use all these elements to examine the licensing 
decision in the competition vs. revenue effect framework developed by Arora and 
Fosfuri (2003). Our focus on the nature of the technology excludes from the analysis 
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any strategic reason involved in licensing decisions; therefore, our research is 
constrained to licensing decisions motivated by revenue earning.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Next section develops the theoretical background. In 
the third section, we explain the empirical methodology used. The fourth describes the 
data and variables. The fifth section presents the empirical results and the sixth 
concludes. 
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
A license on a patent protected technology consists of a contract for which its legal 
holder gives the right to exploit the technology to a third party in exchange for some up-
front fee or/and royalties. Independently of the motivation that leads to licensing, the 
underlying constant is the development of the innovation. Therefore, the nature of the 
technology is likely to affect, in a higher or lower degree, its attractiveness for being 
licensed. Nevertheless, this aspect has been clearly underestimated by the licensing 
literature, with exceptions such as Teece (1986) and Winter (1987). We will analyze the 
licensing decision under this prysma in the framework of the revenue vs. competition 
effect theory (Arora and Fosfuri, 2003). 
 
In pure-revenue licensing, where the only aim of the patent holder is to attract a third 
party who exploits her innovation, technological opportunity is a key driver. Shane 
(2001) gathers some dimensions of it -importance, innovativeness and patent scope- in 
order to analyze the likelihood to create a firm from a university patented technology. 
The nature of the technology, thus, drives the willingness to license by the patent 
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holder, who anticipates the interest of potential licensees and, thus, the magnitude of the 
revenue effect. However, technological opportunity is also a driver in the decision to 
exploit a technology by the patentholder. This implies that it will affect her willingness 
to license, since licensing represents extra competition for the patentholder if she is 
present in the product market. The intensity of this negative effect will depend on the 
nature of competition of the market. Therefore, the most likely candidates to be devoted 
to pure-revenue licensing are unexploited technologies, which do not introduce 
competition at all. This is also the case of technologies with multiple applications, some 
of which remain non-developed by the patentholder. This potential to be used in 
multiple domains is as well determined by the nature of the technology.  
 
The characteristics of the innovation also affect the transaction costs that the transfer of 
technology involves, diminishing the expected revenue effect from licensing. Any 
contract entails transaction costs (Williamson, 1991) but in the case of technology 
transfer, these are especially stringent. As Arora et al. (2001) point out, the 
fragmentation of the market for technology across sectors and geographical regions 
causes important coordination costs, mainly search costs. Thus, the technological 
dimensions, by turning the innovation particularly attractive for a certain type of 
licensees, will influence how costly will be to reach them. Motivation costs are 
originated by the partners’ potential opportunistic behavior, fuelled by the information 
asymmetries and uncertainty usually present in knowledge transactions. Characteristics 
of the knowledge asset transacted such as its tacitness, complexity or independence 
(Winter, 1987) influence the presence of these problems and, thus, the easiness of 
transfer. The technological distance between the domains of licensor and licensee 
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affects as well the relevance of motivation costs, given the highly context dependence of 
knowledge (Arora et al, 2001).  
 
Motivation costs may be mitigated in settings where repeated or long-term interactions 
allow firms to build up reputation or to threaten potential opportunism credibly (Arora 
et al, 2001). These contractual mechanisms typically arise in networks of firms from the 
same sector and region, with which coordination costs are also minimal. Therefore, in 
pure revenue licensing, the likely licensee targets does not usually belong to the 
patentholder’s networks. This means that this type of licensing is left to the spot market, 
where transaction costs may thwart deals. Coordination costs to find a potential licensee 
from a different sector or region constitute a huge barrier. The lack of mechanisms to 
soften motivation costs may also deter potential deals, even if we expect them to be less 
relevant than when licensing involves strategic issues. In this scenario, the Internet 
offers the possibility to create a marketplace that overcomes transaction costs without 
introducing the rigidities of traditional technology markets, as it has been the case in 
many business-to-business markets (Garicano and Kaplan, 2001). Different Internet-
based firms were created with the aim to broaden the market for technology. They 
claimed to offer platforms that allowed, first, to get access to a geographically and 
sectorially broad market of licensees with basically absent coordination costs and 
second, to put in place non-restrictive mechanisms to cope to a certain extent with 
motivation costs. This setting is, thus, especially attractive for pure-revenue licensing.  
 
In such a scenery, we will examine which technological dimensions of an innovation 
turn patentholders more willing to license it for pure-revenue reasons. We will consider 
four3: importance, scope, innovativeness and fit. Importance anticipates valuable 
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technological opportunities and, consequently, a high revenue effect. Scope, a broad 
range of would-be applications across the technological space and a strong legal 
protection. Innovativeness translates into non-developed opportunities by incumbents. 
Fit into the firm strategy favors own development over licensing, which anticipates high 
motivation costs. We develop next how these dimensions affect the willingness to 
license -in order to obtain revenues- by an established firm with research and 
commercialization capabilities in a sector with an active market for technology4. 
 
2.1. Hypotheses 
 
One of the most significant dimensions of an innovation is its technological relevance or 
importance. Technological value has been found positively correlated with the 
economic value of innovations5 (Harhoff et al., 1999; Hall et al. 2005). Therefore, an 
important innovation raises interests to be commercially exploited. This means that it is 
especially attractive for potential licensees, who will be willing to pay for the license, as 
well as for the patentholder, who will be willing to exploit it in the first place. 
Therefore, importance suggests both a revenue and a competition effect. We should as 
well take into account that licensing an important innovation may anticipate high 
motivation costs, fact that decreases the prospects for revenues. Nevertheless, in 
industries proactive in licensing, the concerns on motivation costs become less relevant 
with the perspective of obtaining revenues, as Arora et al. (2001) report for the chemical 
sector. The question, therefore, is whether the prospects for licensing revenues can 
compensate the fall in profits due to an increasing competition in the product market. 
Hence, the effect of importance on the licensing likelihood is ambiguous. 
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Innovative technologies, as their name suggest, represent a breakthrough with respect 
to previous technologies. Arrow (1962) defines an innovation as drastic if it turns the 
old technology obsolete. For an incumbent, it means that the new technology will 
cannibalize the rents she obtains from the existing product or process. Therefore, her 
incentive is to not develop the innovation. On the contrary, entrants, with no rents to be 
cannibalized, are more willing to (Arrow, 1962; Reinganum, 1983). Shane (2001) finds 
that entrepreneurs are more likely to pick up more innovative patents in order to set up a 
new firm. However, when the incumbent who generated such innovation has to 
negotiate its commercialization with a start-up, the result is either internal development 
or shelving, depending on whether she may soften cannibalization through in-house 
mechanisms or not (Cassiman and Ueda, 2006). As well, the adoption of 
technologically novel innovations usually requires radical organizational changes, since 
it requires new competences that render existing procedures obsolete (Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986). Since organizational change is difficult and risky, incumbents remain 
less productive to exploit such innovations (Henderson, 1993). Innovativeness, 
therefore, is a dimension that anticipates interest by start-up licensees, both from a 
technological and an organizational point of view. However, the incumbent will only 
make the technology available for license in sectors or market niches that do not present 
risk of cannibalization, i.e. the ones where she is not active. Traditional licensing 
markets anticipate huge coordination costs in order to get access to potential start-up 
licensees in these typically distant markets. Therefore, the existence of a market that 
alleviates such costs gives incentives to the incumbent to license such innovations. 
Thus, the effect of innovativeness on the incentives for pure-revenue licensing is 
expected to be positive.  
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The fit of an innovation is the degree to which it falls within the core activity of the 
firm. Cassiman and Ueda (2006) define it as the cost saving from internal development 
with respect to external; consequently, innovations with a high fit are internally 
exploited. The source of this cost advantage lies on the organizational and technical 
capabilities that established firms develop associated with their core activities in order 
to appropriate value (Teece, 1986). Therefore, it follows from the same concept of fit 
that there is a disparity between the value that a core technology represents for the 
patentholder and for potential licensees. Obviously, this gap will disappear to the extent 
that the firm’s core capabilities were transferred to the latter. The patentholder’s 
incentives to do so depend on two opposite forces. On the one hand, an innovation from 
the core results attractive for a potential licensee as it reduces the information 
asymmetries present in knowledge transactions. That is, it signals that there is a reliable 
know-how behind the innovation, which turns the innovation more valuable to potential 
licensees. This point should be especially important to reach licensees out of the firm 
markets, where the competition effect is null and information asymmetries are large. On 
the other hand, the transfer of core knowledge implies the disclosure of the 
patentholder’ sources of competitive advantage, entailing high motivation costs. In 
general, this effect is likely to prevail over the former, since its negative consequences 
are not exclusively linked to the particular innovation but they stretch out to other core 
related technologies. Thus, the effect of fit on the incentives for pure-revenue licensing 
is expected to be negative.   
 
There is one particular case, though, in which the reduction of information asymmetries 
associated with the patentholder’s reputation in her core activities can offset the 
negative effects of licensing a core innovation. This is when the innovation happens to 
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be technologically relevant. Indeed, there is a potential complementarity between fit and 
importance. The reduction in information asymmetries with respect to the quality of the 
innovation is likely to become more valuable as the relevance of the technology 
increases. The reason lies on the fact that a signal that reduces uncertainty is worthier 
when there is more value at stake. Hence, the effect of important patents in the firm’s 
core on the likelihood of pure-revenue licensing is expected to be positive.  
 
Scope, or broadness, is a dimension that refers to the technological space the 
innovation covers. A broad innovation is a generic or basic technology from which a lot 
of applications can be derived6. In patent protected technologies, the larger the scope, 
the larger the number of potential products that will infringe the patent (Merges and 
Nelson, 1990). Scope, therefore, offers a broad range of technological opportunities 
unlikely to be drained off by the technology holder through own development or 
traditional licensing. The reason lies on the fact that both alternatives are usually 
restricted to exploit applications around the usual technological space of the firm. A 
setting of low coordination costs that facilitates transactions with potential licensees 
across the technological space would favor the exploitation of the distant applications. 
In patent protected technologies, scope is also shaped by how inventors -or their 
lawyers- “design” the patent, i.e. by the legal description of the innovation. Firms have 
incentives to widen the legal scope because it strengthens the protection of the 
innovation7. Shane (2001) finds that broadness confers an extra protection that is 
especially valuable to entrepreneurs meanwhile they acquire the assets needed to 
develop the technology. Lerner (1994) finds that broader biotech patents protect more 
important inventions and firms holding them receive larger valuations in the venture 
capital investment process. Independently of the direction of the causality between 
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broadness and protection, the key is that the stronger legal protection associated with 
broad innovations is worthwhile in licensing transactions (Arora and Gambardella, 
1994; Anand and Khanna, 2000), especially when the risks involved increase. 
Therefore, we expect that broadness has a positive effect on the incentives for pure-
revenue licensing, due to the interdisciplinarity and extra protection it anticipates. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 
We would like to estimate the probability that a patent holder is willing to license a 
given patented innovation for pure-revenue purposes. The outcome variable is a binary 
dependent variable that captures the decision by the firm whether or not to offer each 
patent for pure revenue licensing8. We should therefore use a discrete choice model with 
the following specification for patent j in firm i: 
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where Y*ij denotes the unobservable propensity of i’s willingness to license j for 
revenue purposes, Xij is a vector of patent-varying exogenous variables, εij is the 
unobservable error term and iα is a variable that captures the firm specific unobserved 
effects. The iα variable should be introduced to the model given that we can not assume 
independence on the error terms. Since there are many patents in the sample owned by a 
given firm i, each firm represents a cluster of correlated observations. The dilemma is 
whether iα  should be treated just as a constant term over firms (fixed effects model) or 
as a random variable like the error term (random effects model). The latter approach 
obtains more efficient estimates but it requires the assumption that the iα ‘s are 
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independent of the Xij’s if our estimates are to be consistent. The Hausman test allows 
testing this assumption (Maddala, 1993). We do not find conclusive evidence for the 
rejection of the null hypothesis of consistency of the random effects model. Moreover, 
we are interested in including some firm-invariant variables (zi) such as the size of the 
firms’ patent portfolio. In this case, if we used the fixed effects model we could not 
estimate their parameters (γ ), because iα  captures the effect of all firm-invariant 
variables. Therefore, we treat iα  as random. The specification is as follows: 
ijiijiij zXY εγβα +′+′+=*  
The probit model is the most appropriate discrete choice technique to estimate it. The 
multivariate normal distribution in which it is based upon is more flexible than the 
multivariate logistic distribution (Maddala, 1993). Therefore, we use a probit random 
effects model. 
 
4. DATA AND VARIABLES 
 
4.1. Data 
 
We rely on data on patent protected innovations. The first reason is that intellectual 
property protection increases the likelihood of transacting with the protected knowledge 
(Arora et al., 2001). The second is data availability. We use the NBER Patent Citations 
Data File (Hall, Jaffe & Trajtenberg, 2001) that contains the population of patents 
granted by the USPTO from 1963 to 1999. This database includes codified information 
at the patent level on many variables that characterize them and that we will use as 
proxies for innovation dimensions. Nevertheless, there is no information on the use of 
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the patent by its assignee. How then to identify the innovations that are intended for 
pure-revenue licensing?  
 
Since, as previously mentioned, pure-revenue licensing is likely to be captured in a 
setting like the Internet, we turn to it in order to identify a marketplace devoted to this 
type of licensing. We focus on yet2.com, the main firm created with this aim on the 
Internet at the time of data collection (first half of 2002) and one of the few that has 
survived9. yet2.com attracted well known research intensive corporations as suppliers of 
licensable patent protected technologies, that were listed for a fee in the yet2.com site, 
classified by technological category and with a brief technological description, 
accessible to anyone. Owners, in order to get their innovations listed, and seekers, in 
order to get in contact with the owner, must pay a fee10. These fees are thought to 
alleviate to a minimum extent disclosure concerns and adverse selection problems in the 
supply of technologies. The only mechanism at work to reduce the uncertainties around 
licensors’ moral hazard is reputation in the general market –this is the reason why 
mainly well known firms are attracted as suppliers-. To sum up, yet2.com offers to 
technology holders the opportunity to reach a broad market, in geographical and 
sectorial terms, incurring in negligible search costs but substantial motivation costs.  
Therefore, we assume that all the patents present in this marketplace are posted for 
pure-revenue licensing. 
 
Therefore, we identify the patent protected innovations for license at yet2.com and the 
firms that offer them11. We restrict our attention to firms12 that offer innovations related 
with the Chemicals and Biotechnology, two sectors with an active market for 
technology, where firms are used to profiting from in-house R&D through licenses as 
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well as to using externally developed technology (Arora et al., 2001). We select them if 
they fall under these categories according to the yet2.com and the USPTO 
classification13. We end up with 904 patents granted to 87 different firms. Then, thanks 
to the NBER Patent Citations Data File, we identify the population of chemical and 
biotechnology patents applied by this set of firms from 1982 to 1999. Once subtracted 
from this population the patents not present in the Internet licensing marketplace14, we 
draw a 10% random sample (8337 observations) that forms the control group15.  
 
4.2. Variables 
 
The dependent variable captures whether the patent holder is willing to license for pure-
revenue reasons each patent. As argued above, we assume that this willingness is 
reflected by posting the patent in the yet2.com marketplace. We assume that each patent 
identified there proxies for an innovation16. Relevant explanatory variables are 
described next. 
 
Recent literature has suggested as proxy for importance the number of citations a patent 
receives from subsequent patents. When an inventor patents an innovation, he must cite 
the scientific prior art (previous papers and patents) he has built upon. Therefore, the 
citations received by a given patent can be interpreted as its contribution to science 
(Jaffe et. al 2000). Different authors have tested the positive correlation between this 
measure and different aspects of value such as social value (Trajtenberg, 1990), 
stockmarket value (Hall et al., 2005) or commercial value of the innovation (Harhoff et 
al., 1999). However, citations present a practical problem: since data is truncated at a 
certain point in time, patents granted closer to it have a shorter time span to receive 
 17
citations. In order to remove variance due to truncation, we standardize the data by year 
and sector following Hall et al. (2001). Alternatively, we simply introduce year 
dummies (Shane, 2001). 
 
The degree of innovativeness is measured by the citations made to previous patents, 
which represent the knowledge that helps to shape the innovation. Therefore, the pattern 
of citations made tells us to what extent the innovation represents a break with the 
previous state of the art or a smooth continuity. An entire original creation is considered 
innovative but it is also the combination of existing knowledge from different 
disciplines. The first view is captured by Lanjouw & Schankerman (1999), who 
consider that a low number of citations made reflect an innovation less derivative and 
more genuine in nature. The second idea is seized by looking at the dispersion across 
patent classes of the cited patents. Hall et al (2001) capture it through originality, a 
Herfindhal-like index that measures the concentration of citations across patent classes17 
-a higher spread of citations made across classes suggests that the invention is not 
sequential but that it “breaks molds”-.  
 
We measure the strategic fit of an innovation in the firm strategy by the weight that 
represents its patent class in the firms’ patent portfolio. Following Song et al (2003), we 
construct a dummy variable, core, which captures whether a patent class of a given 
innovation coincides with the highest frequent classes in the firm’s portfolio18.  
 
In order to measure scope, we follow Trajtenberg et al (1992), who suggest that the 
spread of citations received across patent classes proxies for the technological space the 
patent covers, since they indicate the sectors of activity in which the innovation is 
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applied to. They measure this spread by a Herfindhal-type concentration index of 
citations received, generality19. Lanjouw & Schankerman (1999) propose a measure that 
takes into account the directly protected space: the number of claims, the sentences that 
describe an invention and that are interpreted as “units of invention” (Jaffe, Hall & 
Trajtenberg, 1999)20.  
 
We introduce two different sets of control variables. The first is related with different 
patent characteristics: number of inventors responsible for the innovation, percentage of 
self-citations (both made and received), time and technological category. The number of 
inventors points out to the amount and diversity of knowledge sources that lead to the 
innovation, that may influence its characteristics -such as importance, interdisciplinarity 
or complexity- as well as its transfer –more difficult if the know-how associated to the 
blueprint is dispersed. Self-citations refer to citations a patent makes to or receives from 
patents owned by the same firm and reflect internal flows of knowledge (Hall et al, 
2001). Therefore, it is important to control for them in order to capture the true meaning 
of external citations. Citing the firm’s own patents is a signal of persistence of an 
existing internal research line. Self-citations received reflect the relevance of the 
innovation within the firm as subsequent research builds upon it. The time control –
introduced via the application year of the patent- is required because citation-related 
variables are time-dependent. Finally, since the majority of the independent variables 
vary with technological field, we control for technological category -built upon patent 
classes (Hall et al., 2001)-. The second set of control variables is related with two firm 
characteristics: size and diversification, which may affect the firm’s willingness to 
license as well as the characteristics of her patents and innovations21. Size is meant to 
control for experience in managing intellectual property and access to traditional 
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licensing networks. The most appropriate measure in this setting is patent portfolio, the 
number of USPTO patents granted to the firm in the years previous to the licensing 
decision. Diversification may result in more interdisciplinary innovations, more 
opportunities to exploit them and more accessible licensing networks. We compute a 
diversification measure following Davis et al. (1994)22.  
 
Table 1 presents a summary of variables and Table 2, their descriptive statistics, 
including a t-test for differences of means between the patents devoted to license and 
the rest. The two groups of innovations differ significantly across the majority of 
dimensions -except for citations received and generality-. In Table 3, we present the 
correlation between the variables, significant at the one percent level for the majority of 
them. However, the highest correlation coefficients do not suggest the presence of 
multicollinearity problems, as it is confirmed by high tolerance levels. 
 
 
5.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
In this section, we present the results of the estimation of a probit random effects model. 
Independent variables have been log transformed in order to reduce their skewness23. 
Table 4 presents the marginal effects24 of the different variables on the probability that 
the patent is offered by pure-revenue licensing. We test four different Specifications.  
 
Specification 1 includes only the proxies that represent raw information coming from 
the patent document: number of claims describing the invention, number of citations 
received (creceived) and number of citations made (cmade). The magnitude of the effect 
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of each variable is reflected by the percentual increase in the likelihood (indicated by 
the marginal effect) when its value increases a 1% from its median, with the rest of 
variables kept constant at their median. Creceived displays a non-significant positive 
coefficient. The coefficient on cmade displays an as predicted negative and significant 
sign. Claims displays a significant positive coefficient, which supports the hypothesis 
that broader patents are more likely to be the object of pure revenue licensing. We also 
include a dummy, core, which captures a significant negative effect of the fit of the 
innovation in the firm’s core over the likelihood. We control for portfolio, technological 
category and application year and we obtain that patents by larger firms, patents 
applied earlier in time and patents in the drugs and medical category (opposed to patents 
in the chemicals) are less likely to be licensed for pure-revenue reasons. 
 
In Specification 2, we incorporate two variables built up from the citations: originality 
and generality. The coefficient of the former, even not significant, reinforces the 
positive impact of innovativeness. Generality enters positive and significant, supporting 
the idea that broader patents show up more likely on pure-revenue licensing markets. 
Creceived, the proxy for importance, turns to negative, even though it remains non-
significant.  
 
Specification 3 includes the technological controls: inventors and selfcitations. Results 
remain robust to their introduction, except for core, that loses its significance. The 
proportion of the total error variance accounted for by the random effect is significant 
(rho=.306). The inventors variable itself presents a highly significant positive 
coefficient that deserves attention: the higher the number of inventors who worked 
behind a patent, the higher the likelihood that the patent holder devotes it to pure-
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revenue licensing. This fact may suggest that the resulting innovations are simply more 
interdisciplinary or that they enjoy a bigger protection at the time of transfer25. Self-
citations enter with negative coefficients, significant in the case of self-citations made, 
which suggests that the more a patent sticks to the research line of the firm, the less 
likely it is to be licensed.  
 
Specification 4 gathers the effect of the interesting interaction between fit (core) and 
importance (creceived), which displays an expected significant positive coefficient. The 
introduction of this interaction turns to significant the negative coefficients on 
importance and fit. That is, highly valued patents falling in the core are more likely to 
be licensed than their counterparts that fall out of it, whereas the reverse holds the less 
important they are. Actually, the overall effect of citations turns to positive for patents 
in the core with more than two citations received, i.e. moderately important26. This 
result supports the hypothesis that important innovations from the core are a lure for 
potential licensees, whose higher willingness to pay makes attractive the licensing of 
such innovations by the patentholder 27.  
 
In Table 5 we display results for a sample restricted to the 22 biggest US firms –with 
more than $10 millions in assets and 500 shareholders, as identified in the Compustat 
database-. For these firms we have available an important control variable: 
diversification. Indeed, this variable has the strongest effect on the likelihood (12%). 
This result suggests that diversified firms may have a more proactive licensing policy –
due to a higher awareness of the benefits of pure-revenue licensing- or/and a higher rate 
of underused patents. The inclusion of this control, however, does not lead to any 
significant change in the rest of variables. The restriction to the sample of big firms, 
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however, does introduce some changes. Scope related variables are no longer 
significant, suggesting that big firms do not need the protection that this dimension may 
confer in riskier settings. Originality becomes significant, which reinforces the positive 
effect of the innovativeness dimension and suggests that it has a greater impact on the 
decisions of big well-established firms. The control selfcitations received also turns to 
significant. We observe stronger effects of the variables on the likelihood: the impact of 
creceive in the core, for instance, is more than two times bigger than it is in the whole 
sample.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we examine the willingness to license patented innovations with the only 
purpose of extracting revenues, absent any strategic consideration. Our aim is to 
characterize the technological determinants that affect this willingness at the innovation 
level. The features of the innovations are meant to capture: its technological 
attractiveness for potential licensees, the relevance of transaction costs associated to its 
transfer and the potential to be totally or partially unexploited by the patentholder. 
These ingredients, we argue, are likely to affect the balance between the revenues from 
licensing royalties and the drop in revenues due to the introduction of competition and, 
therefore, the willingness to license by the firm. We consider importance, 
innovativeness, fit and scope the relevant technological dimensions.  
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Using patent data and an original dataset on patented technologies assumed to be 
devoted to pure-revenue licensing, we find that the mentioned dimensions affect the 
patentholder’s decision. In particular, we find a positive impact of importance in the 
core, innovativeness and scope and a negative effect of importance out of the core and 
fit. Moreover, an innovation in a larger portfolio is less likely to be selected for pure-
revenue licensing whereas if it belongs to a diversified firm, this likelihood increases. 
Selfcitations and the number of inventors, not considered up to now by the literature, 
also prove to be informative. Results, therefore, suggest that innovation characteristics 
are actually relevant on the willingness to license in a setting where strategic concerns 
are left aside. Nevertheless, this does not mean that firm variables do not play also an 
important role in licensing decisions. Our findings suggest that the technological 
features of the innovation should be taken into account as licensing drivers. Last but not 
least, we should recall that these findings arise in the framework of the chemical 
industry and they should be interpreted accordingly. Given the particular characteristics 
of the market for technology in this sector – basically, the long and widespread use of 
licensing by firms that compete simultaneously in the market for technology and the 
market for products-, we can not generalize results to the licensing activity of other 
sectors. 
 
We believe our findings are relevant in a more general perspective, as well. They 
suggest that transaction costs involved in technology transfer do not affect equally all 
potential transactions or licensors. Licensing has traditionally emphasized the 
importance to minimize opportunism, which comes at the price of a very restrictive 
network that also reduces the possibilities to find a licensee. We show that potential 
licensors might prefer a contact-network that minimizes the costs to reach partners in 
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order to license, among their technologies, those less vulnerable to opportunism, for 
instance. We must take it into account if we want to derive implications for the claimed 
necessary development of efficient markets for technology. Note, however, that we 
examine here the patentholders’ incentives to license, not their actual licensing activity. 
Therefore, in order to extract conclusions on the efficiency of a more open but also 
riskier licensing market such as the analyzed here, we need to evaluate as well the 
incentives by the demand side. This research line, however, is left for future research. 
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Appendix 1 
Table 1. Summary of variables  
 
 
 
Variable name 
 
 
Description 
 
Proxy 
Citations received  Number of citations the patent receives 
from subsequent patents 
Importance 
Citations made 
 
Number of citations the patent makes to 
previous patents 
Innovativeness 
Originality 
 
Herfindhal index on the spread of 
citations made to different patent classes  
Innovativeness 
Claims  Number of sentences describing the 
invention 
Scope 
Generality 
 
Herfindhal index on the spread of 
citations received from different patent 
classes  
Scope 
 
 
Core 
 
Dummy equal to one if the class of the 
patent is among the highest frequent 
(>10%) patent classes in the firm’s 
portfolio (period 1995-99) 
Strategic fit 
Inventors Number of inventors responsible for the 
innovation listed in the patent 
Technological 
control 
Self-citations received  Share of citations received from patents 
by the same firm 
Technological 
control 
Self-citations made Share of citations made to patents by  the 
same firm 
Technological 
control 
Category dummy 
 
Technological category that corresponds 
to the patent primary class  
Technological 
control 
Application year dummy 
 
Year in which the firm submits the patent 
to the Patent Office  
Time control 
Portfolio Number of patents granted to the firm (in 
any technological category, 1980-1996) 
Firm control 
 
Diversification  Diversification measure Firm control 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics  
 
VARIABLES Mean 
(N=9241) 
Median Min Max Mean 
Y=0 
Mean 
Y=1 
Difference 
of meansζ 
Citations received 4.117 2 0 143 4.125 4.037 .0880 
(.2563) 
Citations made 8.051 5 0 161 7.926 9.199 -1.272*** 
(.3540) 
Originality .3784 .4444 0 .9246  .3744 .4151 -.0407*** 
(.0102) 
Claims 12.84           10 
 
1 183 12.61 15.08 -2.472*** 
(.3933) 
Generality .2238 0 0 .9204 .2244 .2179 .0065 
(.0100) 
Core .3059 0 
 
0 1 .3031 .3318 -.0287** 
(.0731) 
Inventors 2.949 3 
 
1 16 2.941 3.024 -.0825* 
(.0625) 
Self-citations received . 1749 0 0 1 .1777 .1488 .0288*** 
(.0109) 
Self-citations made .2253 .0667 0 1 .2299  .1830 .0469*** 
(.0106) 
Application year            1990 
 
1990 1982 1999 1989.9 1991.9 -1.913*** 
(.1561) 
ζMean comparison t-test on equality of means (H0:mean(0)-mean(1)=0) 
Significance level: .01***; .05** 
 
Table 3. Correlations  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) creceive         --           
(2) cmade         .0670        --          
(3) original       .0613      .3645       --         
(4) claims           .1317 .2059     .0978    --        
(5) general        .5198    .0206     .1701    .0877     --       
(6) core     .0107* .0335 -.1037 -.0077*     -.0781       --      
(7) inventors        -.0645     -.0385    -.0642    -.0331    -.0771    .0998      --     
(8) selfcd .1474      .0495    -.0216     .0470    .1539 .0979    -.0020 --    
(9) selfct -.0175*    -.0074*  -.0419     .0112*     -.0426    .1046 -.0137* .1023     --   
(10) portfolio     .0137*   -.0130*  -.0152*     -.0227   -.0150*    -.1060  -.0225    .0614   .1079    -- 
(11) appyear -.3235 .1566 .0530 .0278 -.3945 .1178 .1680 -.0902 .0232 .0168* 
*Significance level bigger than .05 
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Table 4:  Probit Random Effects, Marginal Effects at the Median 
 
 
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
Importance     
   Citations received .0030 
(.0039) 
-.0035  
(.0047) 
-.0039 
 (.0049) 
-.0139*** 
(.0049) 
Innovativeness     
   Citations made -.0072* 
(.0046) 
-.0088*  
(.0053) 
-.0085* 
(.0054) 
-.0079**    
  (.0041) 
   Originality  .0095 
(.0169) 
.0084 
(.017) 
.0086 
 (.0132)     
Scope     
   Claims .0081** 
(.0043) 
.0081** 
(.0041) 
.0071* 
(.004) 
.0046*  
 (.0030) 
   Generality  .0370* 
(.0202) 
.0361* 
(.0203) 
.0379*** 
(.0168) 
Strategic fit     
 Core 
-.0125* 
(.0073) 
-.0104* 
(.0068) 
-.0081    
(.0067) 
-.0252*** 
(.0087) 
Interactions     
Core x Creceived 
   
.0260*** 
(.0084) 
Technological controls     
Inventors   .0153*** 
(.007) 
.0152***  
(.0057) 
Selfcitations received   -.0057 
(.014) 
-.0093 
(.0112) 
Selfcitations  made   -.0447*** 
(.0185) 
-.0368*** 
(.0153) 
Technological category -.0280*** 
(.0098) 
-.0255*** 
(.0093) 
-.0317*** 
(.0078) 
-.0216*** 
(.0078) 
Application year Included Included Included Included 
Firm controls      
   Portfolio -.0330*** 
(.0078) 
-.0307*** 
(.0076) 
-.0317*** 
(.0079) 
-.0314*** 
(.0085) 
     
Rho .2 .2 .2368*** .3435**                         
N 8583 8553 8553 8553 
Groups 87 87 87 87 
Wald χ2 – test 205.66*** 208.14*** 254.62*** 368.69*** 
 
For dummy variables, effect of a discrete change from 0 to 1 
Standard errors of marginal effects in parentheses.  
Confidence level of the coefficient (not marginal effect) at 1%***, 5%**, 10%*.  
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Table 5: Probit Random Effects, Marginal Effects at the Median. Large firms. 
 
 
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
Importance     
   Citations received -.0033  
(.0054) 
-.0106  
(.0602) 
-.0099 
 (.0092) 
-.0340*** 
(.0149) 
Innovativeness     
  Citations made -.0087  
(.0064) 
-.0195**  
(.0576) 
-.0220** 
(.0111) 
-.0257*** 
(.0126) 
 Originality  .0680** 
(.2148) 
.0657** 
(.0375) 
.0718* 
(.0426) 
Scope     
   Claims .0002 
(.0065) 
.0103  
(.0479) 
.0082  
(.0078) 
.0092 
(.0089) 
   Generality  .0311 
(.2156) 
.0253 
(.0348) 
.0493  
(.0429) 
Strategic fit     
   Core 
-.0207 
(.0152) 
-.0058 
(.0930) 
-.0055  
(.0152) 
-.0688*** 
(.0279) 
Interactions     
Core x Creceived 
   
.0617*** 
(.0251) 
Technological 
controls 
    
   Inventors   .0334*** 
(.0134) 
.0405*** 
(.0155) 
  Self citations           
received 
  -.0482** 
(.0284) 
-.0629** 
(.0338) 
 Self citations made   -.0595** 
(.0321) 
-.0742*** 
(.0377) 
Technological 
category 
-0.245* 
(.0138) 
-.0355** 
(.1357) 
-.0406** 
(.0179) 
-.0502** 
(.0210) 
Application year Included Included Included Included 
Firm controls     
   Portfolio -.0404*** 
(.0106) 
-.0594*** 
(.0735) 
-.0534*** 
(.0174) 
-.0502*** 
(.0210) 
  Diversification .1250*** 
(.0211) 
.1080*** 
(.1225) 
.1137*** 
(.0330) 
.1196*** 
(.0337) 
     
Rho .2009** .3891*** .3666** .3833** 
N 4209 3151 3151 3151 
Groups 22 22 22 22 
Wald χ2 – test 144.84*** 103.72*** 116.25*** 124.56*** 
 
For dummy variables, effect of a discrete change from 0 to 1 
Standard errors of marginal effects in parentheses.  
Confidence level of the coefficient (not marginal effect) at 1%***, 5%**, 10%*.  
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Figure 1. Conditional effect plot for Importance.  
     Rest of variables at the mean, except for core 
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Appendix 2  
  Table 6. List of patentholders sampled from  yet2.com 
    
AG TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. LUBRIZOL CORPORATION 
AGFA-GEVAERT, AG * 
MERCK PATENT GESELLSCHAFT MIT BESCHRANKTER 
HAFTUNG 
ALFA CHEMICALS ITALIANA S.P.A. MINNESOTA MINING AND MANUFACTURING COMPANY * 
ALFA WASSERMANN S.P.A. MITSUBISHI JUKOGYO KABUSHIKI KAISHA * 
ALLIED-SIGNAL INC. MITSUI CHEMICALS, INCORPORATED * 
AMDAHL CORPORATION MITSUI PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRIES LTD. 
ASAHI GLASS COMPANY, LTD.* MITSUI TOATSU CHEMICALS INC. 
ASAHI KASEI KOGYO KABUSHIKI KAISHA MONSANTO COMPANY, INC. * 
B. F. GOODRICH CO. 
NEDERLANDSE ORGANISATIE VOOR TOEGEPAST 
NATUURWETENSCHAPPELIJ 
BASF AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT * NIPPON STEEL CHEMICAL CO., LTD. * 
BATTELLE MEMORIAL INSTITUTE * NIPPONDENSO CO., LTD. 
BAYER AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT * NORDSON CORPORATION 
BRIDGESTONE CORPORATION OBAYASHI CORPORATION 
BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE, INC. OSAKA GAS COMPANY, LIMITED * 
BRITISH TELECOMMUNICATION, PLC PRAXAIR TECHNOLOGY, INC. 
BROMINE COMPOUNDS LTD. PRESTONE PRODUCTS CORPORATION 
CASSELLA AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT PROCTER + GAMBLE COMPANY * 
CATERPILLAR INC. RAYCHEM CORPORATION 
CROWN DECORATIVE PRODUCTS LIMITED REVLON, INC. 
DANA CORPORATION RICHARDSON-VICKS INC. 
DEGUSSA AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT RIEDEL-DE HAEN AG 
DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY * ROBERT BOSCH GMBH 
E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY * ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION * 
EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY ROGERS CORPORATION 
FIRST BRANDS CORPORATION SCOTT PAPER CO. 
FLEETGUARD, INC. SHELL INTERNATIONALE RESEARCH MAATSCHAPPIJ B.V. * 
FRAUNHOFER-GESELLSCHAFT ZUR FORDERUNG DER 
ANGEWANTEN FORSCHUNG E.V. * SHELL OIL COMPANY 
GOLDSTAR COMPANY, LTD. SIEMENS AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT * 
HENKEL KOMMANDITGESELLSCHAFT AUF AKTIEN(HENKEL 
KGAA) SK CORPORATION * 
HIMONT INCORPORATED SPECIALTY COATING SYSTEMS INC. 
HITACHI, LTD SRI INTERNATIONAL 
HOECHST AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT SUMITOMO CHEMICAL COMPANY, LTD * 
HOECHST CELANESE CORPORATION SUMITOMO ELECTRIC INDUSTRIES CO., LTD. * 
HONEYWELL INC. * TARANCON CORPORATION 
IMPERIAL CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES PLC TOKUYAMA CORPORATION 
JOHNSON MATTHEY PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY TOSHIBA CORPORATION * 
KABUSHIKI KAISHA TOYOTA CHUO KENKYUSHO TOYOTA JIDOSHA K.K. * 
KAO KABUSHIKI KAISHA (KAO CORPORATION) * UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION 
KIRIN BEER KABUSHIKI KAISHA 
UNION CARBIDE INDUSTRIAL GASES TECHNOLOGY 
CORPORATION 
KURARAY CO., LTD. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION 
LG ELECTRONICS INC.* UNITIKA LTD. 
LINDE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT WEYERHAEUSER COMPANY 
LIQUID CARBONIC CORPORATION YUKONG LIMITED 
LORD CORPORATION   
   
In bold, firms identified in the Compustat database that form the subsample of large firms 
Followed by *, founding sponsors of yet2.com (at the time of data collection, 2000)  
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Figure 2. Some details on yet2.com  
 
 
 
 
Date of creation: February 2000 
 
Co-Founders:  
 
Ben du Pont, 36, former manager at DuPont of Lycra brand and informally responsible 
for finding new uses for DuPont’s technology.  
 
Chris De Bleser, 44, former manager of the technical and digital-imaging business at 
Polaroid. 
 
 
Fee structure (at the moment of data collection, 2002): 
  
- For buyers, according to access levels:  
 
Level 1. Registration and access free. It includes basic description of the technology,        
 owner not disclosed. 
 
Level 2. Paid access (around 25$) to view (1) a 3 page description (*) of the technology  
  and (2) proposed terms and conditions of licensee 
 
Level 3. Introduction free or for a fee, as set by the provider. On successful deals,  
  yet2.com refunds any introduction fee 
 
- For sellers: 
  
To list: $250 per year per listing. Some memberships include listing fees. 
-yet2.com does some basic checking, verifying that the company actually holds 
the patent it is attempting to license-.  
 
To get introduced: No cost.  
 
On successful deals: 10% of resulting revenue (minimum of $5000 and capped                                                          
  at $50.000).  
 
 
(*) Description of the technology is an important feature of this marketplace. According to yet2.com, patents only 
cover a few of the information potential buyers need. This will include, for instance, suggested applications, the 
technical and/or commercial assistance by the seller, the development stage, the technology benefit or a clear 
description of the technology. 
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Figure 3. The front page of a TechPak (a technology) listed in yet2.com 
 
 
 
Search Technologies Technology Needs 
 
  
   Browse Technologies 
   Browse Technology Needs  
  
   
 
  
  
 
yet2.com TechPak 
 
 
 Actions 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 Cyclodextrin for Odor Control 
 
 
 
This invention provides a stable, inexpensive, highly effective and proof-positive odor-
control from the use of a food starch, cyclodextrin, and moisture activated encapsulated 
perfumes incorporated into various absorbent materials including hydrogels and/or 
cellulose fibers. This new technology uses dry, cyclodextrin powder which is most 
effective in absorbing odors when it is exposed to moisture and solubilized or "wetted". 
Another advantage of cyclodextrin is that when dry, it easily forms a stable perfume 
inclusion complex. The perfume only becomes active when the cyclodextrin is being 
solubilized and removing odor; thus acting as a "scent signal" which indicates when the 
composition is working. Finally, cyclodextrin is easy to manufacture, safe and easy to 
handle, and easy to use in large scale, high speed manufacturing operations. It can be 
combined with other odor absorbent materials such as activated carbon or zealots. The 
cyclodextrin based composition can easily be added to a fluid absorption material such as 
a hydrogel and/or cellulose fibers. Such an invention could be readily used in typical 
consumer goods used for controlling bodily odors, including baby diapers, panty liners, 
and other general sanitary items. It might also be used in paper towels or napkins, 
portable toilets, toilet freshener, cat litter, and carpet and upholstery cleaners. In concert 
with a hydrogel and anti-microbial agents, it might have military uses specifically in 
detection and protection against liquid vapor borne biological agents. Specifics of 
composition (size of particles, proportions, etc), analyses, stability, and manufacture 
(typical applications) are included that would result in shortening the time to market. 
Benefits Summary  
 
This new technology uses dry, cyclodextrin powder which is most effective in absorbing odors when it is exposed to 
moisture and solubilized or "wetted". Another advantage of cyclodextrin is that when dry, it easily forms a stable 
perfume inclusion complex. more  
Development Summary  
 
This technology is currently being commercialized. more  
IP Summary  
 
This technology is supported by 2 US patents. The most recent year of issue is 1998. more   
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Footnotes 
                                                          
 
1
 To mention some examples of technologies coming from or being applied to external industries: the 
fibreglass cables in the telephone industry that were developed by a glass company, Coming; a 
technology developed by Boeing as part of a military application that was used for Touchbridge Systems 
as part of an integrated networking system in the home environment; a new technology for expanding the 
capacity of fiber-optic networks discovered by Polaroid that became quite valuable to telecommunication 
companies. 
2
 Procter & Gamble, for instance, uses both. It hired a panel of technologists to identify new uses for a 
molecule initially used as a low-fat ingredient for snack foods. The more valuable alternative application 
identified was a pollutant remover (Elton et al., 2002). The firm also uses an online marketplace, 
yet2.com, to try to license its technologies either to competitors in the cosmetic industry or to firms from 
distant sectors and regions such as a Korean firm in the water purification industry (www.yet2.com). 
3Our choice is driven by the features of the innovation that can be captured by the characteristics of the 
patent that protects it, due to our reliance on patent data. 
4
 These characteristics guarantee that they have different options available –not necessarily substitutes- in 
order to exploit their technologies, which range from in-house development to different licensing 
strategies. 
5
 We must be aware that patented innovations present a strongly skewed value distribution, which means 
that most of them have no commercial value (Trajtenberg et al., 1997). 
6
 Think on the laser, that has a huge variety of uses. 
7
 Legal broadness is achieved by the most generic possible description of the technology, in such a way 
that the patent builds a wall of protection around the particular technology of interest.  
8A patent not offered for pure revenue licensing can be devoted to different uses: own development, 
and/or licensing, blocking competitors or simply not used at all. Similarly, a patent devoted to pure-
revenue licensing can be simultaneously internally developed, non-internally developed, licensed or even 
used to block competitors - even though the distribution among these uses is likely to differ in the two 
groups-. However, it is not the current use per se that excludes or favors pure-revenue licensing but the 
technological dimension that also affects the current use. Therefore, note that we are not comparing pure 
revenue licensing with the rest of possible patent uses.  
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9
 The other important web-based firm operating in this area was Delphion.com, a spin-off of IBM. It was 
not positioned as a B2B exchange but as a service for research and analysis of patents and related 
intellectual property information, including the availability for license -if patent holders paid to include it. 
From the end of 2002, Delphion, nowadays part of Thomson Corporation, and yet2.com partnered to 
create an integrated listing of licensable technologies and patent information. In the university segment 
survives techex.com, born from Yale University in order to commercialize university patents and acquired 
by UTEK Corp. in 2002.  
10
 See details on fees and other details on the operating of yet2.com in 2002 in Figures 2 & 3 and Table 6.  
11
 Note that we are only able to identify the supply side of this market, which reflects precisely the 
willingness to license by patentholders. yet2.com does not provide details on the actual transactions.  
12
 We exclude governmental agencies or research institutes, since their motivations to license differ from 
those by firms with development capabilities. 
13
 The USPTO assigns the patents to a primary and some secondary patent classes. We use the primary 
class in order to assign the patent to an industrial sector according to the correspondence between classes 
and industrial sectors established by Hall et al (2001). 
14
 Even though patents not present in yet2.com could be listed in any other Internet marketplace, we do 
not consider it likely. First, the customized fee structure favours the number of listings, since it allows 
shifting from a variable fee per listing to a fixed fee. Second, a group of firms listing in yet2.com are 
“founding sponsors”, big R&D intensive corporations that agreed to help building the marketplace by 
posting their technologies online exclusively there (see list in Table 8). Third, a portal created from the 
chemical industry is likely to attract the activity in this area.  
15
 The population that constitutes the comparison group sums up to 61000 patents. Random sampling is 
used in empirical works (Hu, 2003) involving comparison between different patent groups. Alternatively, 
matching samples are also used (Trajtenberg et al, 1992). We choose the first method in order to compare 
the two groups of patents along all dimensions.  
16
 This assumption implies that we take for granted that one innovation is protected by one patent. This is 
not necessarily the case: the number of patents that cover an innovation depends mainly on the sector. As 
Cohen et al (2000) point out, in chemicals a technology is protected by a few number of patents while in 
electronics the number can reach hundreds. Even though data is available at yet2.com at the innovation 
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level, we are not able to use this information in our empirical analysis, since we can only build a control 
group at the patent but not at the innovation level. 
17
 ∑−= j
n
k jkj syOriginalit
21 , where 2jks = percentage of citations made by patent  j that belong to patent 
class k out of nj patent classes 
18
 We consider the highest frequent patent classes those that account for more than a 5% of the firm’s 
portfolio at the five-year time span before the decision of commercialization in the Internet (1995-1999). 
Main results do not change if we use instead a 10% patent share.  
19
 Its expression is parallel to that of originality, with citations made being replaced by citations received.  
20
 This measure can be highly endogenous, since the firm decides how to break down the actual blocks of 
the invention. However, firm discretion is constrained by the type of technology and Patent Office 
examiners. 
21
 These measures are only available for a certain set of firms: public US-based firms with more than $10 
millions in assets and 500 shareholders. 
22
 It takes the form∑ )/1ln( ii pp , where pi is the proportion of the firm’s sales made in segment i. We 
retrieve this information from the Form 10-K filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
23
 In order not to lose observations with a zero value when taking logarithms, we add up one to the 
original variable before doing the transformation. 
24
 We compute the marginal effect at the median of the log transformed variable in order to easily identify 
the original value it corresponds to (i.e. the median of the original variable).  
25
 The more fragmented the sources of know-how, the more difficult is the knowledge transfer expected 
but, at the same time, the easier for the patent holder to keep the relevant information under control. 
26
 This is the median value of this variable. Note that this calculation does not result straightforward from 
the data reported in the table, that are marginal effects and where the variables are in logarithms. 
27
 Note, as an illustration, the case of one of the highest cited patents in our sample – with patent 
protection granted in nine extra countries, fact that emphasizes its importance-. It belongs to Procter & 
Gamble’s core technologies and is related to odour control. According to information provided in the 
yet2.com site, this is a commercialized technology that its patentholder is trying to license, suggesting 
potential applications in the hygiene, food or animal health industries. 
